

# 6GAN: IPv6 Multi-Pattern Target Generation via Generative Adversarial Nets with Reinforcement Learning



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# Background - IPv6 Scanning



## IPv6 Scanning

### Global IPv6 Address Exploration

- Enhancing the ability of researchers to conduct wide-ranging assessments of the next-generation Internet.
- Passive measurement - limited by vantage points to monitor the traffic.
- **Active scanning** - a fast means required by the community.

### Bottlenecks of IPv6 Scanning

- The system sends a ping to each device on the network and awaits a response.
- IPv6 - 128-bit address space - 340 undecillion addresses - **Can not work !**




# Background - IPv6 Target Generation

## IPv6 Target Generation

### Target Generation Algorithms<sup>1,2,3</sup>

- A recently proposed solution to overcome IPv6 scanning bottlenecks.
- **Seed sets** of active IPv6 seed addresses as the input.
- **Structure analyzing** - learning features of the seed set.
- **Target Generation** - predicting the active individuals or regions in the real network space to provide the **candidate set** waiting for scanning.
- **Budget** - the size of the candidate set.

The **quality** of the candidate set is directly determined by the **algorithmic design**.



[1] Foremski, P., Plonka, D., Berger, A.: Entropy/ip: Uncovering structure in ipv6 addresses. In: Proceedings of the 2016 Internet Measurement Conference. pp. 167–181. ACM (2016)

[2] Murdock, A., Li, F., Bramsen, P., Durumeric, Z., Paxson, V.: Target generation for internet-wide ipv6 scanning. In: Proceedings of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference. pp. 242–253 (2017)

[3] Z. Liu, Y. Xiong, X. Liu, W. Xie, and P. Zhu, “6tree: Efficient dynamic discovery of active addresses in the ipv6 address space,” Computer Networks, vol. 155, pp. 31–46, 2019.

# Challenge - IPv6 Addressing Pattern

## Target Generation Challenge

### Challenge 1 - IPv6 addressing pattern

Network administrators are allowed to freely select IPv6 address configuration schemes, which enables multiple allocation patterns for **interface identifier (IID)** in the address. According to RFC 7707:

<i>Embedded-IPv4</i>	0:0:c0a8:20a	Embedding an IPv4 address 192.168.2.10
<i>Embedded-port</i>	0:0:0:80	Embedding a decimal port 80 for HTTP
<i>IEEE-derived</i>	250:56ff:fe89:49be	Inserting word “fffe” between OUI and the rest of the Ethernet address
<i>Low-byte</i>	0:0:0:a	Only setting the least significant bytes in one or two lowest-order
<i>Pattern-bytes</i>	face:b00c:0:a7	Specific addressing patterns different from the above
<i>Randomized</i>	7c61:2880:3148:36e1	Privacy addresses with a pseudorandom IID representation

- 2001:0db8:0106:0001:????:????:????:???? - How to determine ?
- Multiple IPv6 schemes cause difficulty in algorithmic inferences.

# Challenge - IPv6 Aliasing

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## Target Generation Challenge

### Challenge 2 - IPv6 Aliasing

Aliased addresses refer to all addresses under aliased prefixes, which unconditionally respond to scan queries but are not bound to unique devices. For instance:

*2001:db8::/32 is a known aliased prefix.*

*Then 2001:db8::20:1a is an aliased address.*

- Aliased addresses seriously affect the accuracy of host discovery approaches.
- Performing alias detection has been a consensus in IPv6 scanning.

# Consideration

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## Multi-Pattern Target Generation


- Addressing patterns could be clustered into limited categories.
- Target generation can't bear the **pressure of the whole IPv6 address space**.
- A deep eye on **each addressing pattern** are urgently required.

## Algorithm-level Alias Detection

- Candidate sets detection - consuming the budget to generate aliased addresses.
- Seed sets detection - reconstructing the aliased address during prediction.
- **Discouraging learning aliased prefixes** during algorithmic execution.

# 6GAN

## Overall Architecture




- **Seed Classification** - pattern discovery through known seed classification methods.
- **Generator Learning** - generating addresses with k pattern types to deceive the discriminator.
- **Discriminator Learning** - distinguishing between fake addresses generated by generators and real addresses.
- **Alias Detection** - helping prevent the generation of aliased addresses at the algorithmic level.

# 6GAN

## Seed Classification

we provide the following three seed classification methods to promote **pattern discovery** and determine **the number of generators k**:

- **RFC Based** - According to possible IPv6 addressing patterns proposed in RFC 7707, the `addr6` tool in `ipv6toolkit`<sup>4</sup> can match the patterns mentioned in RFC 7707.
- **Entropy Clustering** - Gasser et al.<sup>5</sup> proposed entropy clustering, which uses information entropy of the nybble value under the same prefix in the seed set as a prefix fingerprint to perform unsupervised clustering to discover the prefix-level pattern set.
- **IPv62Vec** - Cui et al.<sup>6</sup> proposed IPv62Vec, which implements the mapping from address space to vector space by learning the addressing patterns with similar context of words in the address.



[4] F. Gont, “Security/robustness assessment of ipv6 neighbor discovery implementations,” 2012.

[5] O. Gasser, Q. Scheitle, P. Foremski, Q. Lone, M. Korczynski et al., “Clusters in the expanse: Understanding and unbiasing ipv6 hitlists,” in Proceedings of the 2018 Internet Measurement Conference, IMC, 2018, pp. 364–378.

[6] T. Cui, G. Xiong, G. Gou, J. Shi, and W. Xia, “6veclm: Language modeling in vector space for ipv6 target generation,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2008.02213, 2020.



# 6GAN

## Generator Learning


Target generation problem - **address sequence decision-making problem**

- A hexadecimal IPv6 address  $X_{0:T} = (x_0, \dots, x_t, \dots, x_T), x_t \in V = \{0, 1, \dots, f\}$
- State  $s$  at timestep  $t$  - currently produced address nybbles  $X_{0:t-1} = (x_0, \dots, x_{t-1})$
- Action  $a$  - the next nybble value  $x_t$  to be select
- $G_{\theta_i}(a = x_t | s = X_{0:t-1})$  - the probability of performing action  $a$  at the state  $s$
- $Q_{AD_\phi}^{G_{\theta_i}}(s = X_{0:t-1}, a = x_t)$  - assessment of the sequence  $X_{0:t}$  based on the discriminator  $D$  and the alias detector  $A$

- The objective function  $J(\theta_i)$  of the  $i$ -th generator :

$$J(\theta_i) = \sum_{t=1}^T G_{\theta_i}(x_t | X_{0:t-1}) Q_{AD_\phi}^{G_{\theta_i}}(X_{0:t-1}, x_t)$$

$$Q_{AD_\phi}^{G_{\theta_i}}(s, a) = Q_{D_\phi}^{G_{\theta_i}}(s, a) + \alpha Q_A^{G_{\theta_i}}(s, a) \quad \text{where } \alpha \text{ is a hyperparameter.}$$



# 6GAN

## Generator Learning

- At each timestep  $t$  - incomplete sequence  $X_{0:t}$   
To produce a complete sequence  $X_{0:T}$  for judgment
- N-time **Monte Carlo search** with a roll-out policy


$$\text{MC}^{G_{\theta_i}}(X_{0:t}; N) = \{X_{0:T}^1, \dots, X_{0:T}^N\}$$

All generators of 6GAN use **Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)** cells to model  $G_{\theta_i}(a|s)$ :

$$p(x_t|X_{0:t-1}) = \text{softmax}(c + wh_t)$$


$$\text{where } h_t = \text{LSTM}(h_{t-1}, x_{t-1})$$

- The parameters are a bias matrix  $c$  and a weight matrix  $w$ .
- Softmax function achieves the selection probability of  $x_t$ .
- Each generator independently learns the addressing pattern to generate specific pattern addresses.



# 6GAN

## Discriminator Learning



### Multi-class classification objective

- Trained with **the real-world seed addresses** and **the generated addresses**.
- $k + 1$  categories -  **$k$  pattern categories** and **a fake category**.

- The objective function  $J(\phi)$  of the discriminator is:

$$J(\phi) = - \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb{E}_{X \sim p_i} [\log D_{\phi}^i(X)] - \mathbb{E}_{X \sim G_{\theta}} [\log D_{\phi}^{k+1}(X)]$$

- $D(X)$  scores - the probability of a sample being judged as the  $i$ -th pattern-type address.


# 6GAN

## Discriminator Learning

- The discriminator provides the reward  $Q_{D_\phi}^{G_{\theta_i}}(s, a)$

$$Q_{D_\phi}^{G_{\theta_i}}(s = X_{0:t-1}, a = x_t) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N (1 - D_\phi^i(X_{0:T}^n)), & X_{0:T}^n \in \text{MC}^{G_{\theta_i}}(X_{0:t}; N) \quad t < T \\ 1 - D_\phi^i(X_{0:t}) & t = T \end{cases}$$

- The discriminator of 6GAN is implemented using **Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)** with multiple filters.
- **Adversarial training** - k generators and one discriminator will be trained alternately to achieve their respective goals.



# 6GAN

## Alias Detection


An alias prefix  $P_{0:L} = (p_0, \dots, p_t, \dots, p_L)$

- The alias detector provides the reward  $Q_A^{G_{\theta_i}}(s, a)$
- The alias detector identifies an aliased address when  $P_{0:L} = X_{0:L}$

$$A(X) = \begin{cases} \lambda & P_{0:L} = X_{0:L} \\ 0 & P_{0:L} \neq X_{0:L} \end{cases}$$

$$Q_A^{G_{\theta_i}}(s = X_{0:t-1}, a = x_t) = \begin{cases} \frac{t}{NL} \sum_{n=1}^N A(X_{0:T}^n), X_{0:T}^n \in \text{MC}^{G_{\theta_i}}(X_{0:t}; N) & t \leq L \\ 0 & T \geq t > L \end{cases}$$

- Positive rewards are only provided on the prefix part.
- Coefficient  $\frac{t}{L}$  - **hierarchical rewards**.
- More likely updating the high index and helping reduce the wide range changes of the prefix region.



# Evaluation

## Dataset and Evaluation Method

### Dataset

- **IPv6 Hitlist** - Public dataset. <sup>7</sup>
- **CERN IPv6 2018** - Passively collected address sets under the China Education and Research Network from March to July 2018.

### Evaluation Method

- Zmapv6 tool. <sup>8</sup>
- ICMPv6, TCP/80, TCP/443, UDP/53, UDP/443 scanning.
- Continuous scanning for three days.

Dataset	Description	Period	#Seeds
IPv6 Hitlist	Active addresses	June 27, 2020	610.9k
	Source addresses		100.0k
	Aliased prefixes		516.1k
CERN IPv6 2018	Active addresses	March - July 2018	90.1k

[7] Gasser, O., Scheitle, Q., Foremski, P., Lone, Q., Korczynski, M., Strowes, S.D., Hendriks, L., Carle, G.: Clusters in the expanse: Understanding and unbiasing ipv6 hitlists. In: Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018. pp. 364–378. ACM (2018)

[8] IPv6 Hitlist. <https://ipv6hitlist.github.io/>

# Evaluation

## Evaluation Metric

A real-world address seed set with  $k$  types of pattern

$$S = \{S_1, \dots, S_t, \dots, S_k\}.$$

A candidate set  $C$  using the  $t$ -th pattern generator.

- **Pattern quality** - the imitating ability of the generators to each addressing pattern.

$$Pattern(C) = \frac{1}{|C|} \sum_{i=1}^{|C|} \min\{\psi(C_i, S_{t_j})\}_{j=1}^{|S_t|}$$

- **Novelty quality** - the algorithmic ability to generate new address sequences.

$$Novelty(C) = \frac{e}{|C|} \sum_{i=1}^{|C|} (1 - \max\{\varphi(C_i, S_j)\}_{j=1}^{|S|})$$

Where  $\psi$  is the Cosine similarity function,  $\varphi$  is the Jaccard similarity function,  $e = 100$ ,  $T$  is the real active target set in the IPv6 space and  $T_a$  is the real aliased addresses set.

- **Diversity quality** - whether candidate set is a diverse set, which contains a variety of seeds

$$Diversity(C) = \frac{e}{|C|} \sum_{i=1}^{|C|} (1 - \max\{\varphi(C_i, C_j)\}_{j=1}^{|C|, j \neq i})$$

- **Hit rate** - the proportion of active addresses in the candidate set.  
ability.


$$Hit(C) = \frac{|C \cap T - C \cap T_a|}{|C|}$$

- **Generation rate** - the proportion of the active addresses in the seed set.  
ability.

$$Generation(C) = \frac{|C \cap T - C \cap T_a - C \cap S|}{|C|}$$

# Evaluation

## Pattern Target Generation



Seed Classification	Budget Allocation	#Targets	Generation(C)
None	1	0.5k	1.06%
RFC Based	11:3:3:1:19:10	12.7k	25.43%
Entropy Clustering	2:1:3:8:1:26	16.9k	33.82%
IPv62Vec	13:70:40:141:1:1	9.1k	18.19%

6GAN's budget allocation

Given the generation rates of k patterns  $(r_1, \dots, r_i, \dots, r_k)$  and the total budget  $|C|$ .

- the allocated budget of i-th pattern  $|C_i|$ :

$$|C_i| = \frac{r_i}{\sum_{j=1}^k r_j} \times |C|$$

The budget allocation of 6GAN could be represented as  $(|C_1| : \dots : |C_k|)$ .

3 metric scores on each pattern

- 6GAN has a strong ability to imitate most patterns.
- Generation rate - the active user distribution in the addressing patterns.



# Evaluation

## Pattern Discrimination

6GAN's discriminator can be optimized to achieve pattern discrimination.

- The overall accuracy of the discriminator reaches **0.966** scores for the 6 pattern types.
- 6GAN discriminator possess sufficient capacity to recognize addressing patterns in the IPv6 space.

Category	#Labels	# Preds	#Hits	#Errors	Accuracy
Embedded-IPv4	4.38k	4.54k	4.17k	0.37k	0.954
Embedded-port	0.57k	0.52k	0.50k	0.02k	0.898
IEEE-derived	3.19k	3.37k	3.18k	0.19k	0.998
Low-byte	12.82k	12.04k	11.93k	0.11k	0.931
Pattern-bytes	0.73k	1.49k	0.51k	0.98k	0.701
Randomized	28.31k	28.04k	28.02k	0.02k	0.990
Total	50.00k	50.00k	48.31k	1.69k	0.966

# Evaluation

## Performance of Alias Detection

### Seed set

- 50k active addresses - 50k non-aliased addresses
- 50k source addresses - 7.9k aliased addresses and 42.1k non-aliased addresses

Seed set	Alias Detection	#Aliased Targets	Percentage
Active addresses	W/o	0.01k	0.02%
Active addresses	W/	0.00k	0.00%
Source addresses	W/o	6.91k	13.82%
Source addresses	W/	0.01k	0.02%

### Ablation study results

- Training with non-aliased addresses - Recombining the aliased prefix during the sampling.
- Training with dataset containing aliased addresses - Greatly reducing the generation of aliased addresses.
- 6GAN's generator could intelligently avoid exploiting alias regions due to the reward guidance from the alias detector.
- **High-quality candidate sets** without wasting budgets.

# Evaluation

## Quality of Generated Addresses

### Baselines


Approach	Target Generation	Alias Detection	Goal
Entropy/IP [13]	Analyzing addressing structures through information entropy	-	Visual address distribution
6Gen [14]	Searching the densest address clusters to provide active regions	Sampling scanning	Remarkable performance
6Tree [15]	Dynamic adjusting search directions with a space tree	Dynamic scanning	Faster time complexity
6GCVAE [16]	Reconstructing addresses through variational autoencoder	-	Deep learning attempts
6VecLM [17]	Predicting address sequences through language modeling	-	IPv6 semantics exploration
<b>6GAN</b>	<b>Multi-pattern target generation through adversarial training</b>	<b>Reinforcement learning</b>	<b>Higher-quality candidates</b>

- **Traditional Design Algorithms** - Entropy/IP, 6Gen, and 6Tree.
- **Deep Learning Approaches** - 6GCVAE, 6VecLM, and 6GAN.


# Evaluation

## Quality of Generated Addresses

Approach	Novelty(C)	Diversity(C)	Hit(C)	Generation(C)
Entropy/IP	12.37	6.80	12.03%	7.88%
6Gen	11.09	2.05	14.81%	10.33%
6Tree	11.16	2.06	24.40%	24.39%
6GCVAE	12.00	<b>7.66</b>	13.61%	9.50%
6VecLM	12.35	6.03	33.16%	12.20%
<b>6GAN</b>	<b>12.75</b>	4.73	<b>36.05%</b>	<b>33.21%</b>



(a) IPv6 Hitlist



(b) CERN IPv6 2018

- 6GAN could generate creative addresses with high novelty quality.
- 6GAN obtains a not high diversity quality score.
- 6GAN outperforms all the baseline on the generation rate in our experiments.
- 6GAN could discover **1.03-1.33 times** more active addresses than 6Tree.

# Conclusion

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- We propose a **novel architecture 6GAN** to generate diversified non-aliased active addresses of different addressing pattern types through **using multiple generators guided by rewards from a discriminator and an alias detector**.
- We employ a **multi-class objective of 6GAN's discriminator**, which can identify IPv6 addressing pattern categories.
- We implement **an alias detection approach embedded in the algorithm** by optimizing the generator, which saves algorithmic budget to generate high-quality candidates.
- We push the **quality of candidate sets** to a higher level. Experiments show that 6GAN outperforms state-of-the-art target generation algorithms on multiple metrics.



# THANK YOU FOR LISTENING

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